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NOTE 
Looking a Gift of Stock in the Mouth: Donative Transfers and 
Rule 10b-5 
It may be more blessed to give than to receive. In today's litigious 
securities market, however, the donor of a gift of stock may not be 
"blessed," but may be a target of litigation instead. Consider the fol-
lowing example, in which an officer of a publicly held corporation 
owns a substantial number of shares in the corporation. This officer 
has access to nonpublic information about the future financial health 
of the corporation. Because this information indicates that the corpo-
ration will soon be in a precarious financial state, she can easily foresee 
that the value of the corporation's shares will drop when the informa-
tion is made public. This officer knows she is prohibited by insider 
trading laws from selling her shares at their present, inflated value 
without disclosing the confidential information to which she is privy. 1 
Yet she is unwilling to stand by and watch her shares devaluate. In-
stead, she donates the shares to a charitable organization, taking a 
hefty tax deduction based on the current inflated value of the shares.2 
She then claims immunity from the insider trading prohibitions of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,3 maintaining that the transaction 
1. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (discussing corporate insiders' 
duty to disclose material, nonpublic information). Section IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 prohibits the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" that contra-
venes SEC rules and regulations. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). Rule lOb-5, promulgated thereun-
der, prohibits three specific types of fraudulent or deceptive conduct "in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security": (1) "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud"; (2) "any 
untrue statement of a material fact" or omission of "a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead· 
ing"; and (3) "any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon any person •... " 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1988). 
Section IO(b) and rule lOb-5 thus operate as "catch-all" antifraud provisions, reaching a wide 
range of fraudulent conduct that overlaps and extends beyond the ambit of more specific provi-
sions. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. a.t 226; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202, 206 (1976) 
(quoting Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 115 (1934) (statement of attorney Thomas G. Corcoran), reprinted in 8 J. ELLENBERGER & 
E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 19'33 AND SECURITIES EX· 
CHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 115 (1934) ("The most relevant exposition of"§ IO(b) in the legislative 
history describes it as " 'a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices.' "). 
2. See I.R.C. § 170(a)(l) (1982) (allowing deduction of the amount of a charitable donation 
from gross income). However, a taxpayer may not be entitled to a § 170 deduction if "the donor 
receives or expects to receive additional substantial benefits ..• [such] that a quid pro quo for the 
transfer exists •.•. " Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1124, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(adopting U.S. Claims Court opinion); see also United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 
U.S. 105, 116-17 (1986). Thus, a§ 170 income tax deduction may be lost where an individual 
obtains or expects a substantial benefit from a charitable donation. See infra section III.B. 
3. 15 u.s.c. § 78j(b) (1988). 
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was a gift, not a sale, 4 and thus outside the jurisdictional reach of the 
statute. 
Alternatively, suppose that an individual agrees to donate shares of 
stock to an organization, based upon representations made by the or-
ganization's agent. After title to the shares is transferred, however, 
the donor discovers that the representations were false. The agent 
then defends against securities fraud claims5 by asserting that no 
purchase or sale of securities occurred and that the antifraud provi-
sions of the 1934 Act are therefore inapplicable. 
The above examples highlight an area of ambiguity in federal se-
curities doctrine: although rule lOb-5, promulgated under section 
lO(b) of the 1934 Act, is an important vehicle for imposing liability for 
securities fraud, 6 its contours are ill-defined.7 Broad statutory lan-
guage and divergent judicial interpretations sometimes make it diffi-
cult to determine whether a transaction is a "purchase or sale" within 
the scope of the 1934 Act. 
Section lO(b) and rule lOb-5 require that the allegedly fraudulent 
conduct take place "in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security."8 To evade rule lOb-5 liability, then, one need only charac-
terize the transaction in question as something other than a purchase 
or sale. Not surprisingly, litigants have advanced many creative argu-
ments as to why an allegedly fraudulent transaction is or is not a 
"purchase" or "sale" for the purposes of rule lOb-5.9 The status of 
donative transfers, however, has never been directly addressed in the 
context of section lO(b) and rule lOb-5.10 
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) (§ lO(b)) (requiring that the alleged fraud take place "in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security"); 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1988) (rule lOb-5) 
(same). 
5. Application of the federal securities laws may be desirable because they "can afford relief 
in situations where none would be available on applicable common-law principles" such as fraud. 
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 825 (1983). 
6. See supra note 1. 
7. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) ("[W]e would 
by no means be understood as suggesting that we are able to divine from the language of§ lO(b) 
the express 'intent of Congress' as to the contours of a private cause of action under Rule lOb-
5. ");Friedman, The Concepts of Purchase and Sale under the Federal Securities Laws, 14 N.Y. 
L.F. 608, 615 (1968) ("[F]ocusing on the [1934] Act as a whole, one will never be able to prop-
erly delimit the concepts of purchase and sale."). 
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) (§ lO(b)); 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1988) (rule lOb-5). 
9. See, e.g., Walling v. Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff claimed that 
defendant's entering into contract with "secret reservation" not to perform it constituted fraud 
under rule lOb-5); Garner v. Pearson, 374 F. Supp. 591, 598 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (fraudulent reduc-
tion of assets made depositors "forced sellers" of their securities because the securities had been 
reduced to mere claims in bank liquidation); Keers & Co. v. American Steel & Pump Corp., 234 
F. Supp. 201, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (rejecting claim of fraud when party intending to purchase 
shares died and executor refused to perform, noting "[s]urely [decedent] did not defraud plain-
tiffs by dying"). 
10. Courts have directly addressed the issue of donative transfers only in the context of 
§ 16(b) of the 1934 Act, which is directed at short-swing insider trading. See infra Part II. The 
few rule lOb-5 cases that have touched on the issue of donative transfers have done so only 
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This Note explores whether a gift of stock can constitute a "sale" 
for the purposes of section lO(b) of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5 
promulgated thereunder. Part I reviews the relevant 1934 Act provi-
sions, and concludes that although the statute's language and legisla-
tive history do not mention gifts of stock as such, they support the 
inclusion of gifts within the statute's scope. Part II examines a limited 
line of cases holding that a bona fide charitable gift is not a sale under 
section 16(b) of the 1934 Act. 11 This Part concludes that section 16(b) 
cases are not dispositive of the issue under section lO(b) and rule lOb-5 
because section 16(b) serves different purposes and has a narrower 
scope than rule lOb-5. Part III discusses various transactions which 
courts have analyzed in light of the sale requirement to determine the 
distinguishing characteristics of a rule lOb-5 sale. This Part asserts 
that the hallmarks of a rule lOb-5 sale are a transfer of ownership or 
control of a security, an exchange of value or passing of consideration, 
and consistency with the remedial purposes of the 1934 Act. This Part 
also discusses the scienter requirement, which further limits the kinds 
of transactions subject to rule lOb-5. 12 
Part IV of this Note applies these elements of a rule lOb-5 sale to 
donative transfers. This Part concludes that in certain circumstances 
donative transfers of shares will manifest the three characteristics that 
define a rule lOb-5 sale - an ultimate transfer of ownership or con-
trol, some exchange of value or consideration, and consistency with 
the remedial purposes of the 1934 Act - and will also satisfy the sci-
enter requirement. Finally, Part V evaluates the implications of this 
conclusion, demonstrating that the actual purchaser-seller require-
ment of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 13 and other related 
policy considerations do not preclude a gift of stock from constituting 
a "sale" for rule lOb-5 purposes. 
I. STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF SECTION lO(b) AND RULE lOb-5 
The 1934 Act regulates the trading of securities and the structure 
tangentially. See, e.g., Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D. 
Mo. 1983) (holding that rule IOb-5 claim was not assignable through inheritance); Kreindler v. 
Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., [1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 98,312, at 
91,957, 91,960 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1981) (refraining from addressing claims related to dona· 
tive transfers because plaintiffs stipulated that they were not sales); Center v. Hampton Affiliates, 
Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 96,487, at 93,814 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 
1978) (dismissing plaintiff's claim of fraud in connection with a gift for lack of specificity in 
pleadings). Compare Brown, Corporate Communications and the Federal Securities Laws, 53 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 741, 764 n.83 (1985) ("Under the 1934 Act's definition, some gifts argua-
bly are sales ••.. ") with L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURlTIES REGULATION 248 (1988) ("It 
would be hard to make a 'sale' out of a bona fide gift."). 
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). 
12. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976). 
13. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
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of the federal securities market. 14 As noted above, section lO(b ), the 
statute's omnibus antifraud provision, prohibits the use of "any ma-
nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance," as defined by the rules 
and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, "in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security."15 Rule lOb-5, 
promulgated by the SEC under this rulemaking authority, prohibits 
three specific types of such fraudulent or deceptive conduct.16 This 
Part examines the statutory language and legislative background of 
section lO(b) and rule lOb-5, and concludes that both the language and 
the legislative history support the assertion that certain types of gifts 
should be considered "sales" for the purposes of rule lOb-5. 
A. A Look at the Language 
The logical starting point in determining the scope of a statute is, 
of course, the language of the statute itself. 17 Although the language 
of the 1934 Act does not clearly demarcate the statute's scope, this 
language is broad enough to support the conclusion that some gifts of 
stock constitute rule lOb-5 sales. 
The definitional section of the 1934 Act states that "[t]he terms 
'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose 
of."18 As many courts have pointed out, this language is quite broad, 
and could plausibly be interpreted to include any transfer of a secur-
ity, not merely a sale in the traditional sense.19 First, the verb "in-
clude" suggests that the drafters intended to embrace a wide variety of 
transactions within the term "sale."20 In addition, many courts have 
emphasized the breadth of the phrase "or otherwise dispose of."21 If 
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1988) ("[T]ransactions in securities ..• are affected with a national 
public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transac-
tions and of practices and matters related thereto, ... [and to] perfect the mechanisms of a 
national market system for securities ...• "). 
15. 15 u.s.c. § 78j(b) (1988). 
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b:5 (1988); see also supra note 1. 
17. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps 
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Pinter v. Dahl, 
108 s. Ct. 2063, 2075 (1988). 
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1988). 
19. See, e.g., Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Courts applying Sec-
tion lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 have defined 'sale' broadly so as to extend the panoply of the 1934 Act 
to those who may not be sellers in the c;<>)Ilmon law sense."); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 
383, 385 (5th Cir. 1970) ("'This broad language indicates a Congressional intent not to limit 
'purchase' and 'sale' to traditional face-to-face commercial transactions.'") (quoting Fidelis 
Corp. v. Litton Indus., 293 F. Supp. 164, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). 
20. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir.) ("[T]he [use of the] verb 'include,' 
rather than the verb 'means,' emphasizes the breadth of this definition .... "), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 970 (1967). 
21. See, e.g., Lincoln Natl. Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1979); Coffee, 
434 F.2d at 385; Vine, 374 F.2d at 634 ("the phrase[] ... 'or otherwise dispose of' [is] hardly 
limiting"); Bolger v. Laventhal, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 260, 265-66 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 383 (rev. ed. 1988) 
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any manner of disposing of a security were to constitute a sale, as these 
courts have suggested, then every sort of fraudulent donative transfer 
which disposes of shares would be subject to 1934 Act regulation. 
Not all courts, however, have embraced such a broad interpreta-
tion of the language. In Sacks v. Reynolds, 22 for example, the District 
of Columbia Circuit rejected an expansive definition of sale, conclud-
ing that the "plain meaning" of the 1934 Act's language compelled a 
more restrictive definition. In Sacks, the court held that a transfer of 
stock between brokers, with the same customer retaining ownership, 
was not a transaction within the ambit of the 1934 Act.23 The court 
reasoned that because ownership remained vested in the same individ-
ual, no sale or disposal of shares had occurred. The court suggested 
that a transaction must exhibit the "traditional elements of a sale" to 
fall within the ambit of rule lOb-5, but did not discuss exactly what 
those "traditional elements" are.24 
While the Sacks opinion's reliance on the "traditional elements" of 
a sale seems to preclude interpreting a gift as a rule lOb-5 sale, the 
District of Columbia Circuit's reasoning is unsatisfactory. The court 
offered no explanation as to what "traditional elements" of a sale place 
a transaction within rule lOb-5. Moreover, the Sacks court's "plain 
meaning" approach to the language of the 1934 Act provides little 
insight into the nature of a rule lOb-5 sale.25 Because the relevant 
definitional provision of the 1934 Act includes two phrases with poten-
tially conflicting connotations, a "plain meaning" interpretation 
changes with the statutory phrase one focuses upon. The phrase "or 
otherwise dispose of" is a catchall, which could be read so broadly as 
to encompass a very wide range of securities transactions. In contrast, 
the term "sale" implies a much narrower range of transactions. Thus, 
courts interpreting the same definitional provision have adopted 
widely divergent conceptions of the transactions which comprise a sec-
tion lO(b) sale. 26 
(definition of "dispose of" includes: "to deal with conclusively; settle" and "to get rid of; dis· 
card; give away.") (emphasis added). 
22. 593 F.2d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
23. 593 F.2d at 1240. 
24. 593 F.2d at 1240. 
25. The court's dictionary definition of "dispose of" - " 'to transfer into new hands or to 
the control of someone else (as by selling or bargaining away)' " - is ambiguous at best because 
a gift of shares, by transferring shares into the control of another, "disposes of" those shares as 
effectively as a sale. See 593 F.2d at 1240 n.13 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA· 
TIONAL DICTIONARY 654 (1971)). A gift of shares obviously can transfer those shares into the 
control of someone else. To suggest that the quoted definition excludes transfers which are not 
• traditionally sales is to treat the illustrative parenthetical (" 'as by selling or bargaining away' ") 
as exhaustive. 593 F.2d at 1240 n. 13 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC· 
TIONARY 654 (1971) (emphasis added); see also infra section IV.A; cf. THE RANDOM HOUSE 
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 383 (rev. ed. 1988) (quoted at note 21 supra). 
26. Compare National Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (holding that a pledge of shares as collateral is not itself a § lO(b) sale) with Mallis v. 
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The language of the 1934 Act itself sheds little light on the breadth 
of the term "sale" for section lO(b) purposes. As the Supreme Court 
noted in SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 27 the relevant definitional 
provision of the 1934 Act is "for the most part unhelpful."28 Accord-
ingly, this Note next looks beyond the bare language to its legislative 
history.29 
B. The Intent of the 1934 Congress 
Despite the Supreme Court's emphasis on using the legislative his-
tory of a statute as a guide to the statute's interpretation, 30 legislative 
history is frequently nonexistent or unhelpful. This is certainly the 
case with section lO(b) of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5.31 The legisla-
tive histories of the statute and the rule do not delineate the scope of 
the term "sale"; however, a careful examination of the legislative his-
tory shows that treating certain gifts as rule lOb-5 sales is consistent 
with the antifraud purposes of that rule. 
As numerous courts and commentators have noted with chagrin, 
the legislative history surrounding section 1 O(b) is scant. 32 Congres-
sional concern surrounding the adoption of what is now section 10 of 
the 1934 Act centered on the advisability of prohibiting those fraudu-
lent practices that were rampant at that time, such as short sales and 
FDIC, 568 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1977) (acceptance of pledge as collateral for loan falls within rule 
lOb-5), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 381 (1978); compare also International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 
490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.) (consideration not required for rule lOb-5 sale), cerL denied, 417 U.S. 
932 (1974) with Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d '}.76 (1st Cir. 1968) (consideration essential to rule 
lOb-5 sale). 
27. 393 U.S. 453 (1969). 
28. 393 U.S. at 466. 
29. Cf. Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1916 n.213 
(1989) ("[I]t is incorrect to conclude that, because meaning is ultimately arbitrary, 'anything 
goes' when one offers an interpretation of an old text. • . . The goal is to reconstruct the set of 
meanings - meanings of specific words as well as broader normative considerations - that 
informed the legislators' own use of language."). 
30. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (citing "legislative intent, explicit or im-
plicit" and the "underlying purposes of the legislative scheme" as factors in determining whether 
a statute creates an implied right of action); see also Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-
74 & n.13 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976). 
31. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). In Blue Chip 
Stamps, the Court noted the difficulty of divining legislative intent: "When we deal with private 
actions under Rule lOb-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a 
legislative acorn .... [I]t would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law with 
respect to Rule IOb-5." 421 U.S. at 737. 
32. See, e.g., Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201 (noting that the legislative history is "bereft of any 
explicit explanation of Congress' intent"); 5 A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER 
RULE lOB-5, ~ 5 (1981) ("It is ... regrettable that the legislative and administrative history of 
Section lO(b) and the Rule are so sparse."); Thel, The Original Conception of Section JO(b) of the 
Securities & Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1990) (examining two competing 
conceptions of the 1934 Act in the absence of any clear legislative intent). 
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stop-loss orders. 33 The prevailing view in Congress was that some 
practices were being used solely "for the purpose of artificially raising 
or depressing security prices" and "serve[d] no legitimate function."34 
The drafters hoped to deter a wide range of fraudulent and needless 
transactions, and consequently described the potential conduct 
broadly.35 
The potential breadth of section lO(b) did not go unnoticed. One 
drafter, for example, summarized this provision as a single command-
ment, "Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices," and noted, 
"I do not think there is any objection to that kind of a clause."36 Simi-
larly, a Senate committee report characterized the purpose of section 
lO(b) as "to prohibit or regulate the use of any other manipulative or 
deceptive practices which [the SEC] finds detrimental to the interests 
of the investor. "37 Congress created an omnibus antifraud provision 
to provide flexibility in enforcement, and deliberately eschewed de-
lineating explicit limits for that section. 38 
The background of rule lOb-5 is as cryptic as that of section lO(b ). 
As one commentator has noted, "[t]he brief history [of rule lOb-5] 
consists of a short release, a paragraph in the SEC's 1942 annual re-
port, and the subsequent recollections of an SEC staff attorney."39 
None of this background sheds any light on the jurisdictional scope of 
the rule, beyond the rule's intended use as an "additional protection to 
investors. "40 
All we know for certain, then, is that the drafters of section lO(b) 
proposed to create a flexible antifraud provision to protect investors 
and the securities market from a variety of fraudulent devices. The 
33. Short sales and stop-loss orders are examples of "practices •.• that are intended to mis· 
lead investors by artificially affecting market activity." Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 476; see 
Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrine to Rule JOb-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied 
Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 96, 118 (1985). 
34. s. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934), reprinted in 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E. 
MAHAR, supra note l, at 7. 
35. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 203; 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL 
CORPORATE LAW 1f 9.02 (1975); The!, supra note 32 (arguing that the drafters intended§ lO(b) 
to empower the SEC to regulate virtually any practice that might contribute to speculation in 
securities). 
36. Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 115 (1934) (statement of attorney Thomas G. Corcoran), reprinted in 8 ELLENBERGER & 
MAHAR, supra note 1, at 115; see also Sachs, supra note 33, at 118 n.161. 
37. s. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934), reprinted in 5 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, 
supra note 1, at 18. 
38. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (noting that the 
language of § lO(b) sheds little light on the intended "contours" of a private rule lOb-5 action); 
H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 35, at 1l 9.02. 
39. Sachs, supra note 33, at 120 (footnotes omitted). For a more detailed description, sec 
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967) (re-
marks of Milton Freeman) [hereinafter Freeman]. 
40. Sachs, supra note 33, at 120 n.179 (quoting SEC ANN. REP. 10 (1942)); see also Freeman, 
supra note 39, at 922-23. 
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SEC then promulgated rule lOb-5 as a means to achieve this end. Ap-
plying these provisions to gifts of stock that operate to defraud inves-
tors or attempt to evade federal regulations is fully consistent with 
these purposes. In this respect, the legislative histories of section 1 O(b) 
and rule lOb-5, meager as they are, support the assertion that at least 
some gifts of stock should be treated as sales for the purposes of sec-
tion lO(b) and rule lOb-5. The following two Parts examine another 
important source of guidance: judicial interpretation of the term 
"sale" in the contexts of sections 16(b) and lO(b) of the 1934 Act. 
II. THE SECTION 16 (b) EXPERIENCE 
Section 16(b) is a narrowly drawn provision of the 1934 Act that 
specifically prohibits short-swing insider trading.41 Section 16(b) cre-
ates a cause of action allowing the issuer of a stock (or a shareholder 
suing on the issuer's behalf) to recover short-swing profits obtained by 
a corporate insider who traded on material, nonpublic information.42 
All courts that have addressed this issue have held that charitable gifts 
are not "sales" for the purposes of section 16(b ). 43 At first glance, 
these decisions seem to suggest that a gift likewise would not qualify as 
a sale under section lO(b) and rule lOb-5. However, the section 16(b) 
cases are distinguishable based on the divergent scopes and purposes 
of the sections, and judicial admonitions to interpret different sections 
of the securities laws with regard to context. Thus, section 16(b) cases 
do not preclude certain donative transfers from falling within the 
reach of section lO(b) and rule lOb-5. 
In Shaw v. Dreyfus, the Second Circuit found that a transaction in 
which a corporate director purchased stock and later gave it away as a 
gift was not within the purview of section ·16(b) because the director 
did not personally profit from the transaction.44 The court stated: 
"Certainly bona fide gifts, as these were conceded to be, are not within 
the accepted meaning of 'sales'; nor do they involve 'any contract to 
sell or otherwise dispose of' the property given."45 
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). Section 16(b) states, in pertinent part, that any profit realized 
by a corporate insider "from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity 
security of such issuer .•. within any period of less than six months ... shall inure to and be 
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of [the insider] . . .. " 15 
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). See Kem County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 
582, 595 (1973) ("The statute requires the [statutorily defined] inside, short-swing trader to dis-
gorge all profits realized on all 'purchases' and 'sales' within the specified time period, without 
proof of actual abuse of insider information, and without proof of intent to profit on the basis of 
such information."). 
42. 15 U.S.C. §.78p(b) (1988); see supra note 41. 
43. See Portnoy v. Memorex Corp., 667 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1982); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 
F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949); Lewis v. Adler, 331 F. Supp. 1258 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
44. Shaw, 172 F.2d at 142-43. 
45. 172 F.2d at 142 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1988)). 
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A federal district court in New York had reached the same conclu-
sion the previous year in Truncale v. Blumberg. 46 There, the court 
held that a gift of unexercised stock warrants to charitable agencies 
did not constitute a sale or purchase within the scope of section 
16(b).47 The Truncale court rejected arguments that the defendant, a 
corporate officer with nonpublic knowledge of a future merger, had 
donated stock options as a "tax dodge": "By no stretch of the imagi-
nation ... can a gift to charity or indeed to anyone else when made in 
good faith and without pretense or subterfuge, be considered a sale or 
anything in the nature of a sale."48 
On the surface, the section 16(b) cases suggest that a gift of stock 
should also fall outside the reach of section lO(b) of the 1934 Act and 
rule lOb-5. Although the cases applied a different section of the 1934 
Act, they did examine donative transfers within the general context of 
the 1934 Act, holding that such transfers do not constitute sales. A 
closer analysis, however, demonstrates that the section 16(b) line of 
cases is not dispositive of the status of a gift under section lO(b) and 
rule lOb-5. 
Section 16(b) differs markedly from section lO(b) in both purpose 
and scope.49 Section 16(b) is a narrow provision prohibiting a particu-
lar type of fraudulent activity, insider trading, when conducted under 
specific circumstances.so Section 16(b) has limited applicability, for it 
circumscribes the class of potential plaintiffs (only issuers or share-
holders suing derivatively) and defendants (only a defined class of cor-
porate insiders and ten percent shareholders), and allows recovery 
only of the short-swing profits obtained through insider trading within 
a six-month period.st Accordingly, section 16(b) is not useful in the 
majority of fraud cases, nor even the majority of insider trading cases. 
In contrast, courts have repeatedly termed section lO(b) and rule 
lOb-5 "catchall" antifraud provisions.s2 They are flexibly applied to 
the gamut of fraudulent conduct, including but not limited to insider 
trading, misstatements in financial disclosure statements or prospec-
tuses, and manipulative corporate conduct. s3 The only restrictions 
46. 80 F. Supp. at 387. 
47. 80 F. Supp. at 391. 
48. 80 F. Supp. at 391. Similarly, in a recent Ninth Circuit case, a bank's good·faith dona· 
tion to a charitable foundation was held to be a gift and thus outside the reach of§ 16(b). 
Portnoy v. Memorex Corp., 667 F.2d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 1982). The court did not explain its 
holding, relying on a fiat assertion that the transaction was "a gift, not a sale." 667 F.2d at 1283. 
49. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) with 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988); see also H. HENN & J. 
ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 650 n.19; L. SODERQUIST, SECURITIES REGULATION: A PROB· 
LEM .APPROACH 705 (1982); Brown, supra note 10, at 764 n.83. 
50. H. HENN, CORPORATIONS 767 (1974). 
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). 
52. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202, 206 (1976). 
53. See supra note 1; see also, e.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (applica· 
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placed upon the class of potential plaintiffs are that they be "actual 
purchasers or sellers"54 of the security in question, and that they 
prove the defendant acted with scienter.55 Moreover, the statutory 
language of section 16(b) requires the disgorgement of any profit ob-
tained through insider trading,56 whereas section lO(b) and rule lOb-5 
reach more generally to any fraud in connection with a purchase or 
sale of securities. Thus, a transaction need not involve profit to fall 
within rule lOb-5, so long as some sort of fraud or deception was in-
volved. 57 Furthermore, Congress intended section lO(b) to protect in-
vestors and the market from fraudulent devices of all kinds. 58 Given 
this broader scope, a different and broader interpretation of "sale" 
may be more appropriate for section lO(b) and rule lOb-5 actions than 
has been applied to section 16(b) actions. 59 
Case law further supports the argument that "sale" be interpreted 
more broadly for section lO(b) than for section 16(b). The Supreme 
Court has indicated that, as a general canon of construction, the 
meaning of a particular statutory term cannot be divorced from its 
context. 60 The Court has specifically applied this method of interpre-
tation to the federal securities laws: "The meaning of particular 
phrases must be determined in context . . . . [T]he same words may 
take on a different coloration in different sections of the securities 
laws; both the [Securities Act of 1933] and the 1934 Act[] preface 
their lists of general definitions with the phrase 'unless the context 
tion to corporate reorganization); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (ap-
plication to misleading corporate press release), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, 
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (application to insider trading case). But see Santa Fe 
Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that internal corporate mismanagement is not 
actionable under § IO(b )). For a general overview of the application of § IO(b ), see H. HENN & 
J. ALEXANDER, supra notes, at 82S-31. 
S4. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749, 7S5 (1975). This actual 
purchaser-seller rule is discussed more fully in section V.A infra. 
SS. Hochfelder, 42S U.S. at 201; see A. JACOBS, supra note 32, at § 36. The scienter require-
ment is discussed fully in section IV.D infra. 
S6. lS u.s.c. § 78p(b) (1988). 
S7. See Brown, supra note 10, at 764 n.83. 
Other significant differences between § 16(b) and § IO(b) include: (1) section 16(b) is re-
stricted to transactions involving equity securities, while § IO(b) applies to any security; (2) sec-
tion 16(b) requires both a purchase and a sale within a six-month period, while§ IO(b) requires 
either a purchase or a sale; and (3) the SEC has no enforcement authority under§ 16(b); only 
private individuals can invoke its protection, unlike § IO(b), which is a primary tool for SEC 
enforcement of the 1934 Act. See id. 
S8. See supra note 3S and accompanying text. 
S9. See IS U.S.C. § 78c (1988) (preface to definitional sections, stating "unless the context 
otherwise requires"); see also SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 4S3, 466-67 (1969) (noting that 
words take on different meanings in different provisions of securities laws) (citing SEC v. C.M. 
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-Sl (1943)); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806-07 
(Sth Cir. 1970); Brown, supra note 10, at 764 n.83. 
60. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. at 466. 
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otherwise requires.' "61 Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
a statutory term such as "sale" may take on different shades of mean-
ing with regard to section lO(b) and section 16(b ). 
Moreover, some courts and commentators have indicated that 
Congress specifically intended differing contextual interpretations of 
"sale" for sections 16(b) and lO(b).62 The Second Circuit has adopted 
this method of interpretation: "[W]e do not consider the interpreta-
tion of the terms 'purchase' and 'sale' as used in § 16(b) to be disposi-
tive of their meaning in the context of § lO(b ).''63 The Second 
Circuit's reasoning further supports the assertion that gifts of stock 
could be considered sales for section lO(b) purposes, notwithstanding 
the line of cases finding bona fide charitable donations outside the 
scope of section 16(b). 
In sum, the divergent scopes and purposes of sections 16(b) and 
lO(b ), as well as judicial admonitions to interpret different sections of 
the securities laws with regard to context, demonstrate that section 
16(b) cases are not dispositive of the status of gifts of shares under 
section lO(b ). Thus, certain gifts could be included within the ambit 
of section lO(b) and rule lOb-5 without falling afoul of section 16(b) 
case law. 
III. THE REACH OF SECTION lO(b) 
No federal court has directly addressed the status of a gift of stock 
for the purposes of rule lOb-5, although a great deal of case law inter-
prets the sale requirement in other contexts. Traditionally, courts 
have espoused an expansive definition of the term sale, holding that 
many diverse and nontraditional transactions constitute rule lOb-5 
sales. 64 In recent years, the Supreme Court has cautioned against fur-
ther expanding the scope of the 1934 Act, particularly in the context 
of section lO(b) and rule lOb-5.65 -The Court has not, however, aban-
61. 393 U.S. at 466 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1988) (1933 Act) and 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) 
(1988) (1934 Act)). 
62. See International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1343 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. de· 
nied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir.) (holding that a 
transaction is not a § 16(b) purchase if not conducive to the practices § 16(b) was specifically 
designed to prevent), cerL denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); see also Brown, supra note 10, at 764 
n.83. Professor Friedman asserts: "Any proper search must locate separate limits on the con· 
cepts of purchase and sale for each of the disparate provisions of the Act, and even in some cases 
separate definitions for each rule under the same statutory section." Friedman, supra note 7, at 
615-16. 
63. Vesco, 490 F.2d at 1343 n.8. 
64. The Supreme Court embraced an expansive approach to the term "sale" in early cases 
involving rule lOb-5. See, e.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466-67 n.8 (1969) (not-
ing that the relevant sections of the 1934 Act "indicate the breadth of the statutory terms ['sale' 
and 'purchase'] by using the definitional word 'include' and by including within the definitions 
contracts 'to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire' and 'to sell or otherwise dispose of' 
securities."). 
65. See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978) (cryptically noting that the 1934 Act 
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doned the earlier caselaw: the variety of transactions still within the 
umbrella of rule IOb-5 demonstrates that a given transaction need not 
contain all of the elements of a common law sale to constitute a rule 
IOb-5 sale. 66 
This Part analyzes the requirements of a rule lOb-5 sale by examin-
ing the types of transactions that courts have and have not termed rule 
lOb-5 "sales." This Part begins by describing three characteristics 
that mark a rule IOb-5 sale: (1) a transfer of ownership or control of 
the security; (2) some exchange of value; and (3) consistency with the 
remedial purposes of the 1934 Act.67 This Part then discusses scien-
ter, which has been an essential element of a rule lOb-5 action since 
the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 68 This 
Part concludes that a transaction which exhibits these three transac-
tional characteristics and which involves the requisite scienter is con-
sistent with judicial and statutory conceptions of a rule lOb-5 sale; 
consequently, such a transaction should be actionable as a sale under 
rule IOb-5. This Part thus sets up the framework within which to ana-
lyze whether donative transfers are rule lOb-5 "sales." 
cannot be read "more broadly than its language and statutory scheme reasonably permit"); see 
also Chiarella v. United States, 44S U.S. 222 (1980) (rejecting argument that duty to disclose 
arises from mere possession of material inside information); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 42S 
U.S. 18S (1976) (establishing scienter requirement for private claims under rule lOb-S); Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (197S) (limiting rule lOb-S standing to "actual 
purchasers and sellers" of securities). 
66. For example, some courts have held that consideration or an exchange of value is not 
essential to a rule lOb-S sale. See infra notes 93-9S and accompanying text. Similarly, courts 
have stated that a transaction need not be fully consummated to fall within rule lOb-S, as con-
tracts to sell and purchase are explicitly included in the 1934 Act's definition. See, e.g., Herpich 
v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 807-09 (Sth Cir. 1970); IS U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1988) (defining "sale" 
to include contracts to sell securities). Courts have even deemed conditional and contingent 
contracts to be rule lOb-S "sales." See Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., 7Sl F.2d SSS, 
SS9-61 (2d Cir. 198S); International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, S93 F.2d 166, 181 n.18 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979) ("Vesco II''); Mullen v. Sweetwater Dev. Corp., 619 F. Supp. 
809, 814-16 (D. Colo. 198S). 
67. Two other characteristics have been noted by many courts in determining that a given 
transaction is a rule lOb-S sale: a change in the fundamental nature of the security or in the 
investment decision, and the effect of the transaction on the market as a whole. See, e.g., Keys v. 
Wolfe, 709 F.2d 413, 417 (Sth Cir. 1983) (key question is "'whether the transaction has wrought 
a fundamental change in the nature of the plaintiff's investment'") (quoting Rathborne v. Rath-
borne, 683 F.2d 914, 920 (Sth Cir. 1982)); In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 494 F.2d S28 (3d Cir. 
1974) (court evaluated ultimate effect of merger on shareholders to determine if sale occurred); 
Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.) (adopting "forced seller" theory: because 
defendant's scheme irrevocably changed nature of plaintiff's investment by forcing conversion of 
shares into cash, sale had occurred despite lack of volitional act on plaintiff's part), cert. denied, 
389 U.S. 970 (1967); Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., S78 F. Supp. 342, 346 (M.D.N.C. 
1984) (merger effected change in nature of plaintiff's stock holdings sufficient to predicate rule 
lOb-S standing). These characteristics, however, are not relevant to the status of a gift of shares 
under rule tob-S. 
68. 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976). 
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A. A Transfer in Ownership or Control 
A change in ownership or control of a security is probably the ele-
ment most commonly cited by courts in determining whether a given 
transaction is a "sale." Emphasis on a transfer in ownership or con-
trol is an outgrowth of the definitional language of the 1934 Act, and 
is further supported by considerations of standing articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. 69 
Section 3 of the 1934 Act provides definitions for many of the 
Act's key terms. Section 3(a)(14) defines "sale" simply by stating that 
"[t]he terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or other-
wise dispose of."70 This "or otherwise dispose of" language may ex-
plain why numerous courts regard a transfer of ownership or control 
of a security as one hallmark of a section lO(b) sale.71 
The Second Circuit's decision in International Controls Corp. v. 
Vesco provides a good example of the importance of a transfer of own-
ership or control of shares. 72 In Vesco, the plaintiff brought rule 1 Ob-5 
fraud claims based on a corporation's transfer of shares to its subsidi-
ary. 73 The Second Circuit held that such a transfer did not constitute 
a sale under rule lOb-5, because ownership and controi of the shares 
remained vested in essentially the same hands. 74 The court cited the 
"dispose of" language of section 3(a)(14), stating, "we cannot agree 
that by transferring its ownership of [the shares] to its wholly-owned 
subsidiary ... [the corporation] in any sense 'disposed of' its ... 
stock."75 
In evaluating whether a transfer of ownership or control, and thus 
69. 421 U.S. 723 (1975); see infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1988); see supra notes 18-28. 
71. See, e.g, Lincoln Natl. Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1979) (empha-
sizing "or otherwise dispose of" language of 1934 Act in holding pledge of shares was not a rule 
lOb-5 sale); International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1343 (2d Cir.) (finding no 
transfer of control and therefore no sale where corporation transferred shares to its own subsidi-
ary), cert denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Mccloskey v. McCloskey, 450 F. Supp. 991, 994-95 (E.D. 
Pa. 1978) (deposit of shares into voting trust not a sale where plaintiff's rights as to those shares 
remained essentially unchanged); see also Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 750-51 n.13 (noting that 
the "otherwise dispose of" language indicated that the drafters had clearly anticipated some 
disposition of shares in imposing the sale requirement); 421 U.S. at 764 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) ("To my mind, the word 'sale' ordinarily and naturally may be understood to mean, not only 
a single, individualized act transferring property from one party to another, but also the genera-
lized event of public disposal of property .... "). 
72. 490 F.2d at 1334. 
73. 490 F.2d at 1339. 
74. 490 F.2d at 1343. 
75. 490 F.2d at 1343. A Pennsylvania district court case is also instructive. In Mccloskey v. 
Mccloskey, 450 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Pa. 1978), the court held that the plaintiff's deposit of shares 
into a voting trust did not constitute a rule lOb-5 sale. 450 F. Supp. at 995. The court empha-
sized that even after entering into the trust, the plaintiff retained all the rights of a shareholder 
except the right to vote. Because the plaintiff's interest in her sharc:s was not "terminated or 
transformed in any real sense," and the plaintiff retained ultimate control over the shares, no rule 
lOb-5 sale had occurred. 450 F. Supp. at 995 (emphasis omitted). 
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a sale, has taken place, courts have focused on the ultimate effect of a 
transaction, rather than on a nominal change in title. For example, in 
Vesco, the Second Circuit analyzed the functional effect of the transac-
tion in question.76 Although title to the securities had changed (the 
shares being initially held in the parent corporation's name, then 
transferred to the subsidiary's name), the court was more concerned 
with the actual control of the shares, which had not changed 
fundamentally. 77 
The transfer of ownership or control has even been dispositive 
when a transaction is conditional or contingent, such as when shares 
are pledged as collateral. Before the Supreme Court put this issue to 
rest in Rubin v. United States, 78 the various courts of appeals were 
split as to whether a pledge of shares is a rule lOb-5 sale.79 Those 
circuits which held that a pledge of shares is a rule lOb-5 sale acknowl-
edged that full title to the security does not pass with the pledge. 80 
However, these courts found the potential for a change in ownership 
(should the pledgor default) sufficient to transform the transaction into 
a sale. 81 Other circuits holding that a pledge of shares is not a rule 
lOb-5 sale emphasized the contingent nature of the transaction; these 
courts noted that a pledge of shares does not always involve an ulti-
mate transfer of ownership, for if the pledgor does not default, no 
transfer occurs. 82 Even though the circuits disagreed over the suffi-
76. The court examined the relationship between the two entities, concluding that "as long as 
[the plaintiff] retained sole ownership of [the subsidiary], it retained complete control over [the 
shares] and thus relinquished nothing in the exchange." 490 F.2d at 1343. Accordingly, such a 
"self-dealing" transaction resulted in no ultimate transfer of control, and was not a sale. 490 
F.2d at 1343. 
77. 490 F.2d at 1343. 
78. 449 U.S. 424 (1981). In Rubin, the Supreme Court held that a pledge of shares was a sale 
of an interest in a security for the purposes of the 1933 Act. 449 U.S. at 429-31. Although the 
Supreme Court has not passed on this issue in terms of the 1934 Act, it has noted in dicta that a 
pledge of shares would constitute a sale for 1934 Act purposes. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 
U.S. 551, 554 n.2 (1982). 
79. Brown, supra note 10, at 765 n.84; see, e.g., Northland Capital Corp. v. Silver, 735 F.2d 
1421, 1430 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (describing circuit split); Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 
163-64 (3d Cir. 1980) (pledge is sale under 1934 Act), revel. on other grounds, 455 U.S. 551 
(1982); Lincoln Natl. Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1044 (7th pr. 1979) (pledge is not sale· 
under 1934 Act or Securities Act of 1933). 
80. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1029 (6th Cir. 1979); 
Mallis v. FDIC, 568 F.2d 824, 829 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 381 (1978); see also 
Rubin, 449 U.S. at 429 (holding a pledge of shares a sale under the 1933 Act because a pledge 
vests in the pledgee "a power that could, at the option of the pledgee ... in the event of a.default, 
vest absolute title and ownership."). · 
81. See, e.g., Herber, 604 F.2d at 1044 ("It is possible that a sale may occur at a later point if 
the pledgee in fact forecloses on the stock after default on the loan, for then title actually passes 
and the pledgee becomes an unwilling purchaser of the stock."). 
82. See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1299-
1300 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that a mere pledge is not a sale since "[t]he rights and privileges of 
the parties are not affected by a pledge in the same manner as by a 'sale' or 'purchase' "; foreclo-
sure would, however, bring the pledge within the scope of the 1934 Act since foreclosure would 
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ciency of a contingent transfer of ownership, all focused on the poten-
tial transfer of ownership as the dispositive factor. 
This emphasis on a change in ownership or control is also sup-
ported by considerations of standing - particularly a reluctance to 
grant rule lOb-5 standing to plaintiffs who have not actually purchased 
or sold shares. The Supreme Court addressed this concern in Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. 83 In that case, the Court held that 
a plaintiff lacked standing to sue under the 1934 Act where the defen-
dant's alleged misrepresentations caused the plaintiff to forego 
purchasing stock. 84 The Court held that only actual purchasers or 
sellers of securities may bring suit under rule lOb-5. 85 Although the 
Supreme Court justified its holding by citing the dangers of strike suits 
and problems of proof, it also expressed concern that no actual trans-
fer of ownership had taken place. 86 Without any transfer of securities 
from plaintiff to defendant (or vice versa), there was no transaction 
upon which to predicate standing. 87 
Thus, the first characteristic of a rule lOb-5 sale is the transfer of 
ownership or control, i.e., a disposition, of a security. The require-
ment that some disposition of a security take place is supported by the 
language of the 1934 Act, as well as judicial interpretations of that 
language, and is also supported by the practical considerations in-
volved in notions of standing. 
B. Exchange of Value or Consideration 
In addition to a transfer of ownership or control, courts have held 
that a rule lOb-5 sale must involve an exchange of value. 88 A quid pro 
quo requirement is emphasized in the case law, finding support in both 
the statutory language and traditional common law notions of sale. 
This section asserts that an exchange of value is necessary for a trans-
action to constitute a rule lOb-5 sale; moreover, this section suggests 
result in the actual transfer of title); McClure v. First Natl. Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495-96 (5th Cir. 
1974) (same), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975). 
83. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). For a more detailed discussion of Blue Chip Stamps, see infra 
section V.A. 
84. The plaintiff in Blue Chip Stamps claimed that the defendant deliberately portrayed its 
stock as a risky investment in order to prevent the plaintiff from exercising a court-ordered op-
tion to buy. The defendant then sold the shares to the public at a price that was much higher 
than the court-ordered price. 421 U.S. at 726-27. 
85. 421 U.S. at 731. 
86. 421 U.S. at 741-43, 746, 751, 754. The Court noted that the "or otherwise dispose of" 
language of § 3 indicated that the drafters clearly had anticipated some disposition of shares in 
imposing the sale requirement. 421 U.S. at 750-51 & n.13. 
87. See 421 U.S. at 750-51 & n.13. 
88. See, e.g., Gurvitz v. Bregman & Co., 379 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (stock split is 
not a sale); Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (exchange of mainte-
nance contracts coupled with additional merchandise without charge was a sale because mer-
chandise involved additional maintenance obligations); Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282 (D. 
Mass. 1972) (stock option contract is a sale where part of employment contract). 
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that this "for value" requirement be construed to mean some direct 
and tangible form of pecuniary benefit. 
Section 3(a)(14), the 1934 Act provision defining the term "sale," 
states merely that the term "sale" encompasses "any contract to sell or 
otherwise dispose of" a security. 89 Courts which have imposed a 
value requirement acknowledge that no explicit value requirement was 
included within this definition, and point instead to the definitional 
language of the 1933 Act for guidance. The 1933 Act defines "sale" to 
"include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest 
in a security, for value. "9° The lack of a similar "for value" provision 
in the 1934 Act was merely a congressional oversight, these courts 
claim, and Congress intended the term "sale" to have the same mean-
ing in both statutes.91 Accordingly, these courts have found an ex-
change of value to be an essential ingredient of a 1934 Act sale.92 
Not all courts, however, have accepted the assertion that an ex-
change of value was an unintentional omission or implicit assumption 
with regard to the 1934 Act. In fact, some courts have concluded that 
Congress intentionally omitted an explicit value requirement, and 
that, therefore, no exchange of value need occur for a 1934 Act sale to 
take place.93 For example, in International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 
the Second Circuit held that a stock dividend given by a corporation 
89. is U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1988). 
90. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1988) (emphasis added); see also Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. 2063, 
2076-77 (1988). 
91. Some courts have held that there is no functional difference between the definitional pro-
visions of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. For example, the Seventh Circuit has stated that there 
is "no reason not to interpret the definitions of the two acts in the same fashion." Lincoln Natl. 
Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 
280 (1st Cir. 1968) ("We have no reason to believe that Congress intended, one year after the 
passage of the [1933] Act, to dilute the concept of 'sale' in the [1934] Act."). These courts have 
emphasized that the federal securities laws were meant to be a consistent and coherent whole; 
interpreting the same term in different ways would seem contrary to a unified scheme of federal 
securities regulation. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-37 (1967) (determining the 
proper definition of the term "security"); Brown, supra note 10, at 765 & n.86. 
92. See, e.g., Herber, 604 F.2d at 1041; National Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance 
Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1298 (5th Cir. 1978); Lawrence, 398 F.2d at 280; Gurvitz, 379 F. Supp. at 
1286; Collins, 342 F. Supp. at 1290. 
93. See, e.g., Rathborne v. Rathborne, 683 F.2d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1982); International Con-
trols Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974). In addition, the 
legislative history of the 1934 Act supports this view, suggesting that Congress intended to nar-
row the general scope of the 1934 Act in comparison to the 1933 Act. See Brown, supra note 10, 
at 766 n.86. Compare S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3.12 (1934), reprinted in 11 J. EL-
LENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra note 1, § 3.12 (in the original draft of the 1934 Act, the defini-
tion of"sale" resembled the broader 1933 Act definition) with 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1988) (the 
more narrow definition of "sale" in the current statute). At least one commentator concludes 
that Congress "intentionally differentiated between the definitions in the 1933 and 1934 Acts." 
Brown, supra note 10, at 766 n.86. If Congress did intend to differentiate between the statutes 
even in limited ways, then the assumption that the scope of the 1934 Act necessarily mirrors the 
scope of the 1933 Act is questionable. If, on the other hand, Congress differentiated between the 
two acts by narrowing the scope of the 1934 Act, then imposing a value requirement upon the 
1934 Act is consistent with such differentiation. 
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to its shareholders was a 1934 Act sale, despite the fact that the share-
holders did not proffer anything of value in exchange.94 The court 
explained: 
Nor do we believe, as our dissenting brother suggests, that because 
[appellant's] shareholders were not required to part with consideration 
in return for the dividend of ... stock, the transaction was beyond the 
purview of§ lO(b). By thus focusing on the absence of harm to the re-
cipient shareholders, the dissent simply ignores the fact that the statute 
was intended to safeguard not only the shareholders of a defrauded cor-
poration, but its creditors as well. . . . 
We therefore reject our dissenting brother's paean to literalness in 
construing the term "sale" to require the passage of consideration in or-
der to inject the requisite significance into the disposition of securities.95 
If this interpretation is correct, and the 1934 Act contains no value 
requirement, then it becomes easier to characterize gifts as rule lOb-5 
sales. It seems unlikely, however, that Congress would so drastically 
alter the accepted meaning of "sale" in the 1934 Act without any indi-
cation in the statute or legislative history. As the First Circuit ex-
plained in holding that a written agreement to deliver shares was a 
1934 Act sale: 
We are unable to detect any significant difference so far as the transac-
tion in this case is concerned between the two relevant statutes. Both 
cover contracts for the sale or other disposition of a security .... 
We have no reason to believe that Congress intended, one year after 
the passage of the [1933] Act, to dilute the concept of "sale" in the 
[1934] Act.96 
Absent more definitive evidence suggesting such a dilution, it seems 
reasonable to assume that Congress implicitly incorporated a value re-
quirement into the concept of sale for the purposes of the 1934 Act, as 
well as the 1933 Act. 
Imposition of a value requirement finds further support in tradi-
tional common law notions of sale. Black's Law Dictionary, for exam-
ple, defines "sale" as the "[t]ransfer of property for consideration 
either in money or its equivalent"; it further states that a sale differs 
from a gift "in that the latter transaction involves no return or recom-
pense for the thing transferred."97 Similarly, common law contract 
principles require some passing of consideration, or promise of consid-
eration, to create an enforceable contract to sell.98 The Uniform Com-
mercial Code has also integrated the concept of consideration in its 
definition of "sale": section 2-106(1) of the UCC defines sale as "the 
94. 490 F.2d at 1345. 
95. 490 F.2d at 1346. 
96. Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 1968). 
97. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1200 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). 
98. See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 185-86 (3d ed. 1987); o.w. Hou.ms, 
THE COMMON LAW 253 (1881). 
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passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price."99 Explana-
tions proffered for this requirement of consideration are myriad; 100 
whatever the origin, however, the concept of consideration as a re-
quired element of a sale is deeply rooted in the common law. 
Although many judicial interpretations of rule lOb-5 sales have re-
quired some quid pro quo or exchange of value, that requirement need 
not be interpreted rigidly. Many courts that have required an ex-
change of value have defined "value" broadly. For example, in In-
genito v. Bermec Corp., 101 a United States district court in New York, 
examining a series of transactions involving the sale of cattle and 
maintenance contracts, stated that "consideration sufficient to find a 
disposition of a security for value is not limited to money or prop-
erty." 102 The Ingenito court found that the obligations which arose 
from an exchange of maintenance contracts and the accompanying gift 
of cattle constituted a sale of securities.103 The court reasoned that 
additional cattle created increased maintenance charges and thus re-
quired continuous participation in the defendant's maintenance pro-
gram; accordingly, accepting the gift of cattle necessarily imposed an 
obligation to pay future maintenance charges.104 This loosely struc-
tured quid pro quo - cattle given with the expectation of receiving 
future maintenance contracts - involved an exchange of value suffi-
cient to trigger the protection of the 1934 Act.105 
Other courts have been equally flexible in finding some sort of ex-
change of value in a transaction. For example, the Fifth Circuit has 
deemed an agreement to forbear legal action in exchange for securities 
a rule lOb-5 sale, because the potential plaintiff's surrendering of a 
legal interest provides the "value" in exchange for the securities.106 
Even consideration deemed inadequate has been held sufficient to ful-
fill a value requirement. For instance, in Rekant v. Desser, 107 the Fifth 
Circuit held that a sale had occurred when a corporation issued securi-
ties in exchange for grossly inadequate consideration. The court found 
the inadequacy of the exchange irrelevant in determining whether 
value had been exchanged and a sale had occurred. 108 At least one 
court has even found a value requirement fulfilled when the intended 
99. u.c.c. § 2-106 (1987). 
100. See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 98, at 185-87. 
101. 376 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
102. 376 F. Supp. at 1182. 
103. 376 F. Supp. at 1180-82. 
104. 376 F. Supp. at 1181-82. 
105. 376 F. Supp. at 1182. 
106. See SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 528 (5th Cir. 1974). 
107. 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970). 
108. 425 F.2d at 882; see also Bolger v. Laventhal, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. 
Supp. 260, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (where limited partners surrendered securities in dissolution 
intending to receive cash, surrendering was sale despite no eventual recovery of cash). 
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consideration is later found to be spurious. 109 The case law suggests, 
then, that a value requirement need not be defined by rigid notions of 
what constitutes a sufficient quid pro quo. 
In sum, the concept of an exchange of value as an essential element 
of a rule lOb-5 sale is supported by judicial interpretations of that rule, 
and is consistent with both statutory and common law notions of the 
term "sale." A "for value" requirement is thus the second element 
necessary for a transaction to constitute a rule lOb-5 sale. 
C. Original Purposes of the 1934 Act 
Courts have frequently examined the substance of a transaction in 
light of the perceived purposes of the 1934 Act to determine if that 
transaction constitutes a rule lOb-5 sale.110 Section lO(b) and rule 
lOb-5 were adopted as broad antifraud measures to protect both the 
individual investor and the overall integrity of the securities market. 11 1 
Accordingly, courts often require that a given transaction involve the 
type of fraudulent conduct Congress intended to prohibit by passing 
the 1934 Act as a prerequisite to finding rule lOb-5 liability. 112 
The Supreme Court articulated this approach in SEC v. National 
Securities, Inc. 113 National Securities involved alleged misrepresenta-
tions made during the course of a merger. The misrepresentations 
deceived plaintiffs into voting for the merger, requiring plaintiffs to 
exchange their shares in the original company for shares in the defen-
dant's company. In determining whether this exchange of shares was 
actionable under rule lOb-5, the Court acknowledged that the defini-
tional sections of the 1934 Act, the usual starting point for analysis, 
were unhelpful. 114 Consequently, the Court described the focus of its 
inquiry as "whether respondents' alleged conduct is the typeoof fraud-
ulent behavior which was meant to be forbidden by the statute and the 
rule." 115 
109. See, e.g., Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, 524 F.2d 275, 281 (2d Cir. 
1975) (contribution of shares with no direct consideration a sale under rule lOb-5); Arenstam v. 
Tenney Corp., [1968 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 92,237 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 
1968) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment where securities were issued in ex-
change for worthless properties). 
110. See, e.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969) (describing inquiry as 
whether "broad antifraud purposes of the statute and the rule would clearly be furthered by their 
application to this type of situation"); Lincoln Natl. Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th 
Cir. 1979) (advocating an analysis which evaluates the transaction's "consistency with the pur-
poses for which the legislation was enacted"); Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 527-
28 ("Amenability of particular securities to [the purchase-sale requirement] is determined by 
whether the transactions in which the securities are issued are subject to the abuses sought to be 
eliminated by the individual Acts."). 
111. See supra section I.B. 
112. See supra note 110. 
113. 393 U.S. at 467. 
114. 393 U.S. at 466; see supra section I.A. 
115. 393 U.S. at 467. 
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The Court concluded that the "broad antifraud purposes of the 
statute and the rule" would be furthered by applying section lO(b) and 
rule lOb-5, since the alleged fraud had induced individual investors to 
exchange their shares in much the same way as a typical cash sale.116 
Justice Marshall's opinion, however, shed no further light on the na-
ture or scope of those "broad antifraud purposes." 
Two years later, the Court elaborated on the perceived purposes of 
the 1934 Act in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casu-
alty Co. 117 Although the Court noted that section lO(b) was intended 
to preserve the overall integrity of the securities market, the Court 
cautioned that this was not the only purpose of the 1934 Act - pro-
tecting individual shareholders from fraudulent schemes was an 
equally important goal. 118 In a footnote, the majority reiterated the 
breadth of these purposes: all types of fraudulent schemes were within 
the intended reach of the 1934 Act, both the " 'garden variety' type of 
fraud" and the "'unique form of deception.' " 119 
The' view of the 1934 Act's purposes adopted by the Bankers Life 
Court is flexible and broad. While more recent Supreme Court deci-
sions have tended to cut back on the scope of rule lOb-5, 120 the legisla-
tive purposes approach still gives courts virtually unbridled discretion 
in deciding which fraudulent transactions will predicate liability under 
the 1934 Act. 121 Because this approach gives little definitive guidance 
to courts or litigants in a particular case, it should not be the sole 
criterion for evaluating whether a transaction is a sale under rule lOb-
5. However, consistency with the remedial purposes of the 1934 Act 
remains an important element in evaluating rule lOb-5 sales. 
D. The Scienter Requirement 
In addition to the structural elements of a rule lOb-5 sale, a trans-
action must reflect the requisite mental state to fall within the scope of 
the 1934 Act. This section, therefore, will briefly discuss rule 10b-5's 
scienter requirement. 
As part of its more conservative interpretation of securities stat-
utes, 122 the Supreme Court has established a scienter requirement for 
rule lOb-5 actions. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Court held that 
116. 393 U.S. at 467. 
117. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
118. 404 U.S. at 10. Consequently, it became irrelevant whether a transaction occurred on 
an organized securities exchange or through a face-to-face transaction. 404 U.S. at 10. 
119. 404 U.S. at 11 n.7 ("'[We do not] think it sound to dismiss a complaint merely because 
the alleged scheme does not involve the type of fraud that is 'usually associated with the sale or 
purchase of securities.' ..• Novel or atypical methods should not provide immunity from the 
securities laws.") (quoting A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967)). 
120. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
121. See generally supra Part I and infra section IV.C. 
122. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
624 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:604 
a section lO(b) plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with the 
requisite intent to defraud. 123 
In Hochfelder, the plaintiff brought several 1934 Act claims 
against an accounting firm. The accounting firm had audited the 
records of a brokerage house; during this time, the president of the 
brokerage house induced the plaintiff to invest in a scheme that was 
later found to be fraudulent. 124 The plaintiff alleged that the account-
ing firm was negligent during its periodic audits in failing to discover 
the brokerage house fraud.12s 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment against 
the accounting firm, concluding that a showing of scienter was essen-
tial to a rule lOb-5 claim. 126 The Court interpreted the language of 
section lO(b) and rule lOb-5, particularly the terms "manipulative or 
deceptive" and "device and contrivance," as "strongly suggest[ing]" a 
requirement of "knowing or intentional misconduct."127 Thus, estab-
lishment of the requisite mental state became an essential element of 
any rule lOb-5 action.12s 
In sum, this Part has described three characteristics of a rule lOb-5 
sale. Those characteristics are (1) a transfer of ownership or control of 
a security; (2) some exchange of value; and (3) consistency with the 
remedial purposes of the 1934 Act. In addition, this Part has dis-
cussed the Supreme Court's establishment of a scienter requirement in 
rule lOb-5 actions. Thus, a framework exists within which courts can 
evaluate a given transaction to determine whether that transaction 
falls within the range of conduct prohibited by rule lOb-5. The re-
mainder of this Note uses this framework to evaluate donative transac-
tions under rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act. 
IV. EVALUATING A GIFT OF STOCK AS A RULE lOb-5 SALE 
As previously discussed, 129 the definitional provisions of section 
lO(b) and rule lOb-5 fail to delineate in more than a cursory way the 
kinds of transactions included within their scope. Moreover, the his-
tory of section lO(b) and rule lOb-5 sheds little light on the status of a 
gift of shares. 130 Similarly, judicial review of donative transfers under 
the 1934 Act has been limited to interpretation of section 16(b).131 No 
123. 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976). 
124. 425 U.S. at 188-90. 
125. 425 U.S. at 190. 
126. 425 U.S. at 212-15. 
127. 425 U.S. at 197. 
128. 425 U.S. at 212. The Court defined "scienter" as "a mental state embracing intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud." 425 U.S. at 194 n.12. 
129. See supra section I.A. 
130. See supra section I.B. 
131. See supra Part II. 
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court has yet passed on the status of a gift of shares within the context 
of section lO(b) and rule lOb-5.132 
The previous Part described a four-part framework within which 
courts evaluate the substance of a transaction to determine if that 
transaction is a sale subject to the strictures of rule lOb-5. Analysis of 
gifts of securities in light of this framework demonstrates that donative 
transfers should be deemed rule lOb-5 sales in some circumstances. 
A. The Transfer of Ownership Requirement 
The first element of a rule lOb-5 sale requires that the transaction 
result in a transfer of ownership or control of the security.133 There 
can be little doubt that a gift of stock transfers ownership or control of 
a security, thus satisfying this first requirement. A gift of shares neces-
sarily involves a divestment of ownership and control.134 In this re-
spect, a genuine gift is similar to traditional notions of sale, as there is 
a disposition of title and control. A gift of stock results in the same 
permanent transfer of ownership and control that courts have empha-
sized in the context of rule lOb-5 sales; to this extent, then, treating a 
gift of stock as a rule lOb-5 "sale" is fully consistent with existing 
judicial emphasis on a transfer of ownership or control. 
B. The Exchange of Value Requirement 
The second element of the suggested framework requires some ex-
change of value or consideration as part of the transaction. 135 This 
requirement is suggested by the statutory language of the 1933 Act, 
and is consistent with traditional notions of the term "sale." At first 
glance, there seems a clear intuitive distinction between a gift and a 
sale: in a sale, some consideration or thing of value is exchanged for 
another, while a gift presumably involves the disposition of something 
of value without recompense. 136 Thus, the value requirement will 
place many gifts outside the scope of rule lOb-5. 
Requiring an exchange of value as an element of a rule lOb-5 sale, 
however, need not place all donative transfers outside the reach of the 
132. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
133. See supra section IV.A. 
134. See Colliton, The Meaning of "Contribution or Gift" for Charitable Contribution Deduc-
tion Purposes, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 973, 975 (1980) (discussing gifts in context of federal income tax 
regulation). 
135. See supra section IIl.B. Some courts have argued that no value requirement attaches to 
the 1934 Act. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. While this Note concludes that the 
imposition of a value requirement is the better view, if the 1934 Act does not contain a value 
requirement, then it becomes much easier to argue that donative transfers fall within the scope of 
rule lOb-5. 
136. See, e.g., United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986); Commis-
sioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); see also BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (3d 
ed. 1969) (defining "sale" to include consideration); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1200 (5th ed. 
1979) (same). 
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1934 Act. First, certain kinds of donative transfers do provide some-
thing of value to the donor. An obvious example is that of the gift 
which results in financial benefit to the donor through the workings of 
the federal income tax code. Consider the hypothetical described ear-
lier, involving a corporate insider with nonpublic information about 
the declining value of her shares. If this insider gives away those 
shares, she may be entitled to take a tax deduction based on the cur-
rent market value of those shares.137 That deduction may be quite 
sizable, especially in relation to the future market value of the shares. 
In such a case, tax benefits would provide tangible economic "value" 
to satisfy the exchange of value requirement. 138 Thus, rule IOb-5 lia-
bility could attach to this type of donative transfer which has all the 
earmarks of insider trading, but masquerades as a charitable gift. 
Second, if a broader notion of value is used, as discussed above, 
donative transfers that provide the giver with other kinds of benefits or 
values could be included within the scope of rule IOb-5. As one com-
mentator has noted in the context of gifts made to charitable 
organizations: 
[A] great variety of benefits, tangible and intangible, direct and indirect 
... may accrue to transferors as a result of what they claim to be charita-
ble contributions. At one end of the benefits spectrum is the personal 
satisfaction that a donor receives from a generous act of philanthropy. 
At the other end is the direct and tangible economic benefit that a trans-
feror receives when selling property to a charitable organization at a 
price below its fair market value. Within these two extremes are benefits 
such as those realized by the transferor as an individual member of the 
general public which ... derives benefits from the transferee's charitable 
activities, the good will that a business may derive from its name being 
identified with the charitable organization or property owned by it, the 
increased value of privately-owned property occasioned by its proximity 
to a public park, roadway or school, and the direct benefit that may be 
derived from services performed for the transferor by the charitable 
organization. 139 
The concept of value in the gift-giving context is admittedly a slip-
pery one. If this part of the suggested analysis is to be workable in any 
practical sense, some guidelines as to what constitutes sufficient value 
are needed. 
The Seventh Circuit suggested a workable definition of value in 
137. I.R.C. § 170 (1982); see also M. ROSE & J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
664-79 (3d ed. 1988); supra note 2. 
138. See SEC v. International Mining Exch., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1981) 
(holding that tax benefits may be profit for purposes of federal securities laws); Stowell v. Ted S. 
Finkel Inv. Servs., 489 F. Supp. 1209, 1221 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (same), ajfd., 641 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 
1981); Brown, supra note 10, at 764 n.83. 
139. Hobbet, Charitable Contributions - How Charitable Must They Be?, 11 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1, 2 (1970). 
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CBI Industries v. Horton. 140 In Horton, a corporate insider used non-
public information to target lucrative purchases of securities, then de-
posited the profits in a trust fund for his sons. 141 The Seventh Circuit 
held that the defendant did not personally profit from the short-swing 
sales of the shares, and thus did not violate section 16(b) of the 1934 
Act.142 The court held that a corporate insider must gain some "di-
rect pecuniary benefit" in order to be liable for the profits from such 
an insider purchase.143 
The Seventh Circuit's articulation of a "direct pecuniary benefit" 
standard defines the requirement of an exchange of value. The "direct 
pecuniary benefit" standard strikes the appropriate balance between a 
need for flexibility in evaluating transactions and the need for coherent 
line-drawing. It is sufficiently flexible to encompass within rule lOb-5 
more ingenious methods of direct benefit, such as substantial income 
tax deductions, yet would exclude from the reach of rule lOb-5 intan-
gible benefits, such as a donor's emotional gratification, and indirect 
benefits, such as the benefits accruing to a relative. 
Using the Horton court's "direct pecuniary benefit" standard, then, 
a reviewing court should examine the donative transfer in question to 
see if such a benefit flows from the transaction. 144 This sort of tangible 
benefit would fulfill the value requirement of the suggested framework. 
If no direct pecuniary benefit accrues to the donor as part of the trans-
action, then no value was exchanged, and consequently, the transac-
tion falls outside of section lO(b )'s scope. 
C. Consistency with the Remedial Purposes of the 1934 Act 
As discussed previously, courts have often examined the substance 
of a transaction with regard to the underlying purposes of the 1934 
Act to determine if that transaction should be termed a rule lOb-5 
sale.145 Because certain types of donative transfers can defraud inves-
tors or interfere with the integrity of the securities market as much as 
any transaction traditionally deemed a sale, their inclusion within the 
140. 682 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1982). 
141. 682 F.2d at 644. 
142. 682 F.2d at 646. 
143. 682 F.2d at 646. The court rejected a broader notion of "benefit" in which "ties of 
affinity or consanguinity" or "an enhanced sense of well-being" would provide sufficient personal 
gain to trigger § 16(b) liability. 682 F.2d at 646. 
144. Cf Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). In Dirks, the Supreme Court held that the SEC 
must show that a defendant personally benefited from disclosing inside information ("tipping") 
in a rule lOb-5 prosecution for insider trading. In discussing what kind of personal gain triggered 
a duty to disclose, the Court sketched a loose notion of "benefit," speaking of "a direct or indi- · 
rect personal benefit ... such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into 
future earnings." 463 U.S. at 663. The Court elaborated: "For example, there may be a rela-
tionship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an 
intention to benefit the particular recipient." 463 U.S. at 664. 
145. See supra section III.C. 
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scope of rule lOb-5 is consistent with the remedial purposes of the 
1934 Act. A look at the legislative history of the Act, and section 
lO(b) in particular, makes clear that Congress intended to protect the 
investor specifically and the securities market in general from fraudu-
lent and manipulative conduct. 146 Indeed, the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly characterized section lO(b) and rule lOb-5 as broad antifraud 
provisions, aimed at prohibiting the gamut of fraudulent practices.147 
Including certain gifts within the scope of rule lOb-5 is fully consis-
tent with these prophylactic purposes. If a donative transfer of stock 
had a detrimental effect on the securities market or individual inves-
tors, such as the insider trading hypothetical from the introduction to 
this Note, 148 or if it were part of a fraudulent scheme, such as the 
fraudulently induced donation in the second hypothetical, 149 that don-
ative transfer would be at the heart of the conduct Congress meant to 
prohibit. 150 Thus, imposing rule lOb-5 liability in such cases is en-
tirely consonant with the Congressional purpose behind the 1934 Act. 
D. Scienter 
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court established a 
scienter requirement, holding that the plaintiff in a rule lOb-5 action 
must show that the defendant possessed the requisite mental state. 151 
Because some donors or donees might have acted with the requisite 
intent, the Court's scienter requirement does not necessarily place all 
gifts of stock outside the scope of the 1934 Act. The Supreme Court 
has defined scienter in this context as "a mental state embracing intent 
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."152 The Court's definition is thus 
grounded in the language of section lO(b ), specifically the terms "ma-
nipulative or deceptive" used with the terms "device or contri-
vance." 153 Certainly the typical bona fide gift - for example, a 
grandparent's gift of shares to a child - would lack the essential ele-
146. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text; supra notes 117-19 and accompanying 
text. 
147. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202-06 (1976); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 
404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
148. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4. Many commentators dispute the assumption 
that insider trading is an undesirable phenomenon. See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING 
AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 
STAN. L. REv. 857 (1983). Because federal securities statutes currently prohibit insider trading, 
see supra note 1, this Note accepts the proposition that insider trading is undesirable. 
149. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
150. See supra section 111.C; Brown, supra note 10, at 764 n.83. 
151. 425 U.S. 185, 185 (1976). This case and the scienter requirement are discussed more 
fully supra in section 111.D. 
152. 425 U.S. at 194 n.12. 
153. 425 U.S. at 197-98; see 15 U.S.C. § 'Z8j(b) (1988). 
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ment of scienter. Such a bona fide gift would be made with a genuine 
donative intent - not the intent to defraud, deceive, or manipulate. 
In some situations, however, an individual can make a donative 
transfer with the intent to defraud or deceive, or in an attempt to 
evade the proscriptions of the securities laws. The two hypotheticals 
described above provide good examples of donative transfers involving 
the required scienter. The first hypothetical, in which a corporate in-
sider donates shares to a charity after obtaining nonpublic insider in-
formation, would clearly evince the donor's knowing and intentional 
attempt to circumvent insider trading regulations. 154 The second hy-
pothetical, involving the solicitation of gifts via misrepresentations, 
demonstrates the donee's knowing and intentional attempt to defraud 
the giver. 155 
Thus, the Court's holding in Hochfelder does not preclude the in-
clusion of all gifts within rule lOb-5 - it excludes only those donative 
transfers which are made without the requisite scienter. Indeed, dona-
tive transfers which manifest the required mental state, that is, those 
gifts involving an intent to defraud or deceive, strike at the heart of the 
conduct prohibited by section lO(b) and rule lOb-5. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUGGESTED APPROACH 
The previous Part examined donative transfers in light of the ele-
ments essential to a rule lOb-5 sale. That Part concluded that some 
donative transfers of stock could exhibit those four elements; and thus 
are appropriately considered rule lOb-5 sales. This Part explores the 
implications of that conclusion. First, this Part discusses the applica-
tion of the actual purchaser-seller requirement articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 156 to dona-
tive transfers. This Part demonstrates that this requirement is inappo-
site to a fully <;:onsummated donative transfer, because the actual 
purchaser-seller requirement excludes only individuals who have not 
actively participated in a securities transaction. Next, this Part exam-
ines two related policy considerations, the fear of a drastic increase in 
rule lOb-5 litigation and the fear of a chilling effect on potential gift-
givers, and finds them equally inapposite. Thus, inclusion of donative 
transfers within the scope of rule lOb-5 is supported by relevant policy 
concerns. 
A. The Actual Purchaser-Seller Rule 
The Supreme Court stemmed the growth of rule lOb-5 litigation 
154. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
155. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
156. 421 U.S. 723 (1976). 
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when it decided Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores in 1975.157 
Blue Chip Stamps irrevocably changed the future of rule lOb-5 litiga-
tion by sharply restricting the class of potential plaintiffs under that 
rule to actual purchasers and sellers.158 This section asserts that the 
Court's holding in Blue Chip Stamps does not affect the standing of a 
donor or donee who wishes to invoke section lO(b) of the 1934 Act, so 
long as that individual actively participated in the transaction at 
issue. 159 
In Blue Chip Stamps, the defendant provided a trading stamp ser-
vice to retailers. As part of an antitrust consent decree, the defendant 
was required to offer its securities to various retailers who had previ-
ously used the stamp service. The plaintiff, one of the retailers who 
did not purchase the securities when first offered, alleged that misrep-
resentations accompanying the offer made the investment prospects 
look overly pessimistic.160 The plaintiff further alleged that the de-
fendant had deliberately phrased the prospectus in this way in order to 
discourage the plaintiff (and other retailers) from purchasing the 
stock. 161 
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's claim, affirming the 
"actual purchaser-seller" rule or "Birnbaum rule" which states that 
only actual purchasers or sellers of a security have standing to bring 
an action under rule lOb-5.162 In Blue Chip Stamps, the Court rea-
soned that because the plaintiff had refrained from purchasing the se-
157. 421 U.S. at 723; see L. SODERQUIST, SECURITIES REGULATION 438-39 {2d ed. 1988); 
Jacobs, Standing to Sue Under JOb-5 After Blue Chip Stamps, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 387, 388 (1976). 
158. See 421 U.S. at 723. 
159. A related issue that has arisen in the context of standing concerns the assignability of 
claims under the 1934 Act. In Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180 
(\V.D. Mo. 1983), plaintiffs alleged a variety of state and federal fraud claims, including a rule 
IOb-5 claim, against the issuer of worthless revenue bonds. The court dismissed the claims 
presented by three particular plaintiffs who had inherited their bonds, reasoning that investors 
who were "clearly neither 'sellers' nor 'purchasers' of [the] bonds" lacked standing to sue. 562 F. 
Supp. at 1188. 
At first glance, Rose seems to rule out the possibility of a gift falling within the ambit of rule 
IOb-5 by denying standing to a recipient of a gift of stock. Nevertheless, Rose is consistent with 
the proposition that certain donative transfers fall within the 1934 Act. In Rose, the alleged 
misstatements and omissions occurred when the defendant initially transferred the bonds to the 
donor {but the donor was not the plaintiff in the case). There was no fraud alleged in conjunction 
with the transfer of the bonds from the donor to the plaintiff-donee. Put simply, the defendant 
did not fraudulently induce the plaintiff to purchase the bonds, but allegedly induced a third 
party, the donor, in an earlier and separate transaction. Thus, the court's primary concern was 
not so much with the type of transfer that had occurred (e.g., the gift-sale distinction), as with 
the directness of the plaintiff's relation to the fraudulent conduct. 562 F. Supp. at 1188. 
160. See 421 U.S. at 726. 
161. See 421 U.S. at 726-27. 
162. See 421 U.S. at 749, 755; see also Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 
(2d Cir. 1952). In Birnbaum, the plaintiffs were a group of shareholders who brought a class 
action against the corporation in which they owned stock. They alleged that various misrepre-
sentations regarding a transfer of shares between two of the defendants defrauded the plaintilf-
shareholders. 193 F.2d at 462. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint, holding 
that rule lOb-5 did not prohibit all instances of corporate misconduct. Because the plaintiffs had 
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curities, and thus had not actually bought or sold the securities, the 
plaintiff was not a purchaser within the meaning of the 1934 Act. 163 
The Supreme Court's stated reason for adopting the actual pur-
chaser-seller rule was the fear of "vexatious litigation which could re-
sult from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs."164 The Court's 
concern was twofold: first, granting standing to potential plaintiffs 
who were only remotely related to any transaction would increase the 
likelihood of strike suits and frivolous claims; and second, the lack of a 
close nexus between the plaintiff and any transaction would markedly 
complicate questions of proof and causality.165 
The actual purchaser-seller rule, however, would not exclude every 
donative transfer of stock from the scope of rule lOb-5. The Birnbaum 
rule does not impose any structural requirements upon a rule lOb-5 
transaction, but requires that the plaintiff have actively participated in 
that transaction. The doctrine screens out "might-have-been" transac-
tions - transactions that did not actually~occur, but which, absent the 
defendant's alleged fraud, might have taken place.166 A typical dona-
tive transfer is not a "might-have-been" transaction; rather, it is a fully 
consummated transfer of stock. As long as the plaintiff has actively 
participated in the transaction, the actual purchaser-seller rule will not 
exclude that transaction from the scope of rule lOb-5. 
B. The Dangers of "Vexatious Litigation" 
Construing certain gifts as 1934 Act sales will not run afoul of the 
concern with spawning needless litigation which the Supreme Court 
articulated in Blue Chip Stamps. The Court, in adopting the actual 
purchaser-seller rule, believed that the rule would limit the number of 
prospective plaintiffs, thereby preventing strike suits and suits where 
proof of the relevant facts was likely to be difficult. 167 However, the 
danger of "vexatious litigation" concerning donative transfers would 
be minimal. 168 First, including gifts within the definition of "sale" 
would not expand the class of potential plaintiffs beyond those who 
' 
not personally participated in the allegedly fraudulent transactions, they had no standing under 
rule lOb-5, which protects only the defrauded purchaser or seller. 193 F.2d at 463-64. 
163. See 421 U.S. at 754. In so holding, the Court noted that the consent decree did not give 
the plaintiff any contractual right to purchase the securities; had there been some contractual 
arrangement, the Birnbaum rule would not apply. See 421 U.S. at 749-50. 
164. 421 U.S. at 740. 
165. See 421 U.S. at 740-43. 
166. For example, in the Birnbaum case, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants rejected a 
merger which would have been extremely profitable for the plaintiffs. See 193 F.2d at 462. 
Although a breach of fiduciary duty was involved, plaintiffs did not directly participate in any 
transfer of stock. 193 F.2d at 463. Similarly, in Blue Chip Stamps, the plaintiffs did not actually 
purchase securities from the defendants, but sued because misrepresentations allegedly caused 
them to forgo purchasing securities. 421 U.S. at 727. 
167. 421 U.S. at 740-44. 
168. Brown, supra note 10, at 764 n.83. 
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actually transact in the security (although admittedly it could increase 
the overall number of rule lOb-5 plaintiffs). Plaintiffs, defrauded do-
nors or donees of stock, will have actively participated in the transac-
tion at issue. As mentioned in the preceding section, 169 the Blue Chip 
Stamps decision would exclude only those potential plaintiffs who 
might have given or received shares if not for the alleged fraud. Those 
individuals are the "might-have-been" transactors barred by the actual 
purchaser-seller rule. 
Second, the class of potential plaintiffs under rule lOb-5 would also 
be limited in a practical sense. Only the donor, the donee, or the SEC 
would have standing to sue under rule lOb-5.170 Moreover, practical 
constraints would naturally tend to limit the number of lawsuits in-
volving donative transfers. It is likely that the number of donee-plain-
tiffs would remain small, because the typical donee presumably would 
not have suffered any real losses in accepting a gratuitous transfer of 
stock. 171 This lack of incentive on the part of most donees would de-
crease the likelihood of "strike suits," thus effectively limiting standing 
to those who are genuine victims of fraud. 
Since the actual purchaser-seller rule does not logically extend to 
the typical donative transfer, and since including gifts within the defi-
nition of "sale" would not unduly expand the potential class of plain-
tiffs, the Blue Chip Stamps holding does not preclude a gift of stock 
from being termed a sale. 
C. The Chilling Effect 
Interpreting certain donative transfers as rule lOb-5 sales will not 
create any appreciable "chilling" effect on potential gift-givers. One 
might argue that subjecting gifts to the strictures of rule lOb-5 would 
discourage parties from entering into donative transfers. Assuming 
that society as a whole benefits from the process of gift-giving, particu-
larly in the context of charitable contributions, any such chilling effect 
would create significant policy considerations that might militate 
against application of rule lOb-5 to donative transfers. 
However, at least two reasons explain why such a chilling effect 
will not materialize. First, as a practical matter, the parties to a trans-
action would not have any incentive to bring suit under the 1934 Act 
absent some sort of serious fraud ~r misrepresentation. For example, 
consider a common gift-giving situation in which a relative donates 
169. See supra section V.A. . 
170. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1988) (authorizing the SEC to bring injunction proceedings in 
federal court); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l (1988) (authorizing the SEC to seek civil penalties in federal 
court); Brown, supra note 10, at 764 n.83. 
171. See Brown, supra note 10, at 764 n.83. One possible occasion where the donee might 
suffer a loss would be if the donee in some way relied on the stated value of the gift to her 
detriment. 
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shares of stock to a child. Unless some sort of fraudulent conduct is 
involved, the donee will generally be better off after receiving the gift, 
and would have no incentive to bring suit. In addition, the close ties 
that often exist between a donor and donee may make it even less 
likely that either would wish to sue in connection with a gift. 
Second, where an individual makes a bona fide gift - a gift with 
no intent to defraud or deceive - a plaintiff would be unable to plead 
or prove scienter. Since the Supreme Court has hel~ that scienter is an 
essential element of a rule lOb-5 claim, 172 parties to a bona fide dona-
tive transfer need not fear liability under rule lOb-5. Only those do-
nors who consciously intend to defraud or deceive would manifest the 
requisite scienter and be exposed to rule lOb-5 liability.173 Thus, an 
individual making a bona fide gift, whatever the circumstances, would 
not be exposed to liability, and should not be discouraged from giving. 
In sum, none of the above policy considerations - the policies 
giving rise to the actual purchaser-seller rule, the fear of excessive liti-
gation, or a potential chilling effect on gift-givers - is a likely out-
come should gifts be included within the ambit of rule lOb-5. To the 
contrary, inclusion of those donative transfers which demonstrate the 
four characteristics of a rule lOb-5 sale would further the broad an-
tifraud purposes that underlie congressional adoption of the 1934 Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Section lO(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 
lOb-5 promulgated thereunder are sweeping provisions aimed at 
prohibiting a wide range of fraudulent and manipulative conduct. Sec-
tion lO(b) and rule lOb-5 are limited by their language to fraudulent 
and manipulative conduct that occurs "in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security."174 However, the contours of that 
phrase are ill-defined; courts have found a multitude of transactions to 
be rule lOb-5 sales, without articulating a consistent framework for 
their conclusions. 
Consequently, the status of donative transfers under rule lOb-5 is 
unclear. The statutory language and legislative history of section 
lO(b) and rule lOb-5 do not address donative transfers directly, 
although inclusion of fraudulent or deceptive gifts is consistent with 
the language and purposes of the statute and the rule. Moreover, 
courts have only analyzed gifts of stock under section 16(b) of the 
1934 Act, a substantially different provision of that Act. Therefore the 
status of gifts of stock under section lO(b) and rule lOb-5 remains 
unresolved. 
172. See supra section 111.D. 
173. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1988). 
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Judicial analysis of transactions with regard to rule lOb-5 yields a 
rough framework for evaluating borderline transactions. Three char-
acteristics of a rule lOb-5 sale have emerged from the case law: (1) a 
transfer of ownership or control of the security; (2) some exchange of 
value or consideration; and (3) consistency with the remedial purposes 
of the 1934 Act. In addition, the transaction must demonstrate the 
requisite mental state, scienter. These elements provide a method for 
evaluating transactions to determine if they are within the scope of 
rule lOb-5. 
Application of these characteristics demonstrates that certain don-
ative transfers should be treated as rule lOb-5 sales. Donative trans-
fers always involve an ultimate disposition of a security, satisfying the 
change in ownership requirement. In addition, certain types of dona-
tive transfers may involve some exchange of value or consideration 
between the parties. Where a donative transfer defrauds investors or 
adversely affects the integrity of the securities market, application of 
rule lOb-5 is especially warranted because application would further 
the remedial purposes of the 1934 Act. Requiring a showing of scien-
ter, moreover, ensures that only donative transfers involving deception 
or fraud will be subject to rule lOb-5 liability. Finally, policy consider-
ations support the inclusion of donative transfers within the ambit of 
rule lOb-5. By adopting the suggested framework, courts could clarify 
the definition of a rule lOb-5 sale, while reaching out to a type of 
fraudulent conduct that masquerades in the guise of a gift. 
- Carol J. Sulcoski 
